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Two  familiar  phenomena  characterize  American  population  distribu-
tion. First,  except for the years between  1810  and 1820,  the urban popula-
tion  has  grown  more  rapidly  than  the rural  in  every  census  decade  since
1790,  and  urban  dwellers  now  comprise  70  to  75  percent  of  the  total
population.  Second,  most  of  the  population  growth  in larger  metropolitan
areas  since  1920  has  been  in  the  suburbs,  and  during  the  early  1960's
suburbanites  became  a majority of the nation's metropolitan  population.
This  paper  is  focused  upon  two  facets  of  the  phenomena  just  de-
scribed.  The  first  section  examines  recent  trends  and the  probable  future
course  of population  distribution  in the United  States.  The  second  section
analyzes  the  social,  economic,  and  political  implications  of  present  and
probable  future  patterns  of  urban  concentration.  The  concluding  section
examines  the role  of  public  policy.
TRENDS  IN  POPULATION  DISTRIBUTION
During  the  1960's  population  growth  in  large  urban  centers  has
slackened  significantly,  both  absolutely  and  relative  to  population  growth
elsewhere.  More  than  anything  else,  slower  growth  rates  in  large  urban
areas  reflect the  lower national  population growth  in this period.  The drop
in  the birth rate not  only means  less growth  in existing  large urban  areas,
but  also  fewer  smaller  cities  and  towns  mushrooming  into  larger  urban
centers.
In  addition,  recent  changes  in  immigration  laws  have  virtually  guar-
anteed  that  foreign  migration  will  account  for  an  ever  diminishing  per-
centage  of  population growth.  Since  most immigrants  settle in larger urban
areas-between  1960  and  1965  they  accounted  for  about  half of  the  net
gain  in  metropolitan  area  population  through  migration-a  permanent
tailing  off  of  immigration  will narrow  the  differential  in population  growth
between  larger urban areas  and the rest of the nation.
Until  recently  migration,  foreign  and  domestic,  contributed  more  to
the  population  growth  of  large  urban  areas  than  did  natural  population
increases  (the  excess  of  births  over  deaths).  Most  of  the  differential  be-
tween rural  and urban  population  growth  rates  was  explained  by domestic
121rural-urban  migration.  But  in the late  1950's  rural-urban  migration  began
to slacken  (Table  1).  Between  1950 and  1960,  annual  net migration  from
nonmetropolitan  counties  averaged  400,000  in the  South,  150,000  in  the
North  Central  states,  and  about  600,000  nationally.  During  the  1960's,
Southern  nonmetropolitan  counties  lost 50,000  annually through  migration
-approximately  one-eighth  as much  as  the annual  rate in the  1950's.
TABLE  1. MIGRATION  PATTERNS,  1950-60
Net Gains Through Migration'
Metropolitan  Areas 2 Nonmetropolitan  Areas
Area  1950-60  1960-66  1950-60  1960-66
Thousands
United  States  8,824  2,772  -5,850  -889
New  England  644  121  - 30  - 1
Mid-Atlantic  584  103  - 156  89
East  North  Central  1,271  - 200  - 406  -181
West  North  Central  284  - 111  -1,084  -464
East  South  Central  87  0  -1,526  -179
West  South  Central  767  259  -1,336  - 69
South  Atlantic  1,782  859  -1,141  - 64
Mountain  780  270  - 216  -176
Pacific  3,209  1,844  35  156
1Data  for  1950-60  are  net  civilian  migration,  for  1960-66  total  migration  (in-
cluding  military). 2Standard  metropolitan  statistical  areas:  counties  containing  a  city  exceeding
50,000  population  or the  suburbs  of such  a city.
SOURCES:  Bureau  of  the  Census,  "Estimates  of  the  Population  of  Counties,
July  1, 1966,"  Current Population Reports,  Series  P-25,  Nos.  401,  404,  407,  and  409,
and County  and City Data Book,  1962.
Migration  of Negroes  from the South has  also fallen  off  significantly  in
the  1960's.  Negro  outmigration  reached  a  peak  of  160,000  per year  be-
tween  1940  and  1950.  The  annual  rate  fell  to  150,000  in  the  1950-60
decade  and  to  90,000  per  year in  the  1960-65  period.  More  recent  data
show  an  even  further  decline,  and  since  the  mid-1960's  the  Northeast
coastal  states  have experienced  a net loss of Negroes  through  migration.
The  preceding  remarks  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  claim  that
migration  from  rural  areas  has  ceased.  Perhaps  one-third  of  the  pre-
dominantly  rural  counties  are  still  losing  population,  compared  to  well
over half in the  1950's.  Two changes  have occurred:  a  significant  increase
in the number of rural counties  gaining population  and a  greater  tendency
for migrants  from rural areas  to resettle in other nonmetropolitan  counties.
Two  factors  help  explain  the  drop in  rural-urban  migration.  The  first
is  the  deterioration  of  conditions  within  the  ghettos  of  the  large  cities,
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indicators  of  socio-economic  welfare  have  risen  for  the  total  population
during  the  1960's,  but  within  the  poverty  areas  of  large  cities,  many  of
these  same  indicators  have  declined,  as  has  population.  Apparently,  as
relatively  more  successful  members  of  racial  minorities  have  found  it
somewhat  easier  to  move  to  better  residential  neighborhoods,  the  central
core  ghetto  has become  more  homogeneously  poor.  Since  migrants  from
rural  areas,  particularly  Southern  Negroes,  have  historically  relocated  in
these central ghettos,  deteriorating  conditions  there are probably  dissuading
some  potential  migrants  from moving.
The  second  factor  leading  to  the  decline  in rural-urban  migration  is  a
dispersion  of  manufacturing  employment.  Throughout  World  War  II
and  the  Korean  War,  the  seven  states  of  the  Northern  industrial  belt
(Massachusetts,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Michigan,
and  Illinois)  contained  roughly  55  percent  of  manufacturing  employment
in the United States but less than 40  percent of the total population.  In the
mid-1950's  the  distribution  of  new  manufacturing  jobs  changed  signifi-
cantly.  Between  1956  and  1966,  manufacturing  employment  grew  by
1,840,000  (11  percent)  nationally,  but only  37,000  (less than  1 percent)
in  the  seven  most  heavily  industrialized  states.  During  the  same  period
manufacturing  jobs  jumped  465,000  (26  percent)  in  the  West  and
1,026,000  (33  percent)  in  the  South.
Total  nonagricultural  employment  is  growing  fastest  in  the  least
densely  settled  areas.  Counties  with  no  urban  center  exceeding  10,000
population  and  other  nonmetropolitan  counties  both  experienced  a  5
percent  annual  growth  in  nonfarm  jobs  between  1962  and  1966,  com-
pared  to  4  percent  annually  in metropolitan  areas  and  only  3  percent  in
the thirteen  largest  metropolitan  areas.
Several  factors  have  contributed  to  the  decentralization  of  nonagri-
cultural employment. The American transportation  network has been vastly
expanded  and improved  since  World  War II with the development  of  the
interstate  highway  system,  jet  planes,  pipelines,  and  other  innovations.
Interconnection  of electrical  power  generating  facilities  into regional  grids
has  also brought  large  quantities  of power to less  densely  settled  areas.  In
addition,  many  of the  most rapidly  growing industries,  such  as electronics,
technical  instruments,  and  consumer  durables,  produce  commodities  with
an  above-average  value  per  unit  of  volume  and  weight.  Transportation
costs  in  these  industries  are  consequently  a  lower fraction  of  total  costs,
reducing  the  importance  of  transportation  relative  to  other  cost  elements
in  location  decisions.
Certainly  the  civil  disturbances  of  the  mid-1960's  must  have  played
some  role  in  location  decisions  of  both  individuals  and  businesses.  The
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estimates  the  nation's  largest  cities  experienced  greater  outmigration  be-
tween  1967  and  1968  of  both  whites  and Negroes  than  in  the  previous
seven  years  combined.  Yet  the  dispersion  of  employment  and  the  decline
in  rural-urban  migration  began  considerably  before  the  first  major  riot,
providing  some  evidence  of  a fundamental  change  in location patterns.
The  future  population  distribution  implied  by these  new trends  is  very
interesting.  If  the birth  and death  rates  of  the  early  1960's  continue,  and
if  immigration  laws  are  not  changed  significantly,  the  U.S.  population
should be  approximately  300 million by the year  2000. If present  domestic
migration  trends  continue,  metropolitan  areas  will gain roughly  11  million
new  residents  by  2000 through  migration-a  very  small  amount  consider-
ing that in the  1950's metropolitan areas  added about 6 million migrants.
California's  developing  urban  corridor,  running  from  San  Francisco
Bay  to  the  Mexican  border,  will  receive  more  than  half  of  the  domestic
migrants  to  metropolitan  areas.  Urban  areas  exceeding  3  million  in-
habitants  will  expand  from  40.5  percent  of  the  national  population  in
1965  to  about  48  percent  in  2000.  By  2000  roughly  80  percent  of  the
population  will  reside  in  metropolitan  areas  (i.e.,  in  or  around  cities
exceeding  50,000  population),  compared  to  two-thirds  in  1965,  and  less
than  2  percent  (about  5  million)  will  live  on  farms.
These  projections  make  clear  a  central  reality  concerning  future  pat-
terns  of  population  distribution.  Although  migration  to  large  cities  could
remain  very low compared  to historical trends,  even  a slow national  popu-
lation  growth  rate  will still  cause  significantly  greater  urban concentration.
Large  cities  will become  much  larger,  and  many  smaller  cities  and  towns
will  become  major  metropolises.  These  projections  suggest  that  as much
land will be converted to metropolitan use in the next thirty years as has
been converted in  the preceding two centuries.
Within  metropolitan  areas,  the  suburbanization  of  the  population
appears  to  be  proceeding  at  much  the  same  pace  as  it  has  for  several
decades.  The  population  of  central  cities  in  all  metropolitan  areas  in-
creased  about  1 percent  between  1960  and  1968,  compared  to  a  growth
of  28  percent  in  the  suburbs.  If  central  cities  remain  roughly  the  same
size for the  next three  decades,  then by 2000 the majority of the American
population-170  million  strong-will  reside  in  politically  independent
suburban communities.
CONSEQUENCES  OF  URBAN  GROWTH
Rural communities  bear a  significantly  heavier  burden  of poverty  than
do  cities.  In  1966  nonmetropolitan  areas  contained  31  percent  of  the
population  and  48  percent  of  the  poor,  while  central  cities  accounted  for
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percent  of the population  and 20 percent  of the poor.
Migration  probably  improves  the  living conditions  of most  rural-urban
migrants.  In  some  cases  it  does  not,  and  among  some  the  improvement
may  not  be  enough  to  allow  them to  escape  poverty.  Migration  does  re-
distribute  poverty,  shifting  the  responsibility  of  caring  for the  poor  from
rural  to  urban  areas.
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  city  resident,  rural-urban  migration  has
intensified  the  problems  associated  with  poverty  in  the  city.  The  central
city  is  at  a  disadvantage  relative  to  the  suburbs  in  attracting  or retaining
middle  income  individuals  or new businesses  because the suburbs offer the
prospect of less  taxes for the purpose  of providing services to the poor. The
central  city  spends  far more  on  items  related  to poverty,  such  as  welfare
and  health,  while  the suburbs  are  able to  combine  lower  per  capita  total
expenditures  and  taxation  with  much  higher  per  capita  expenditures  for
education  (Table  2).
TABLE 2.  PER CAPITA  EXPENDITURES  AND  REVENUES  OF  CENTRAL  CITIES
AND  SUBURBS,  1965-66
Average for Ten  Average for Ten
Item  Central Cities1 Suburban Counties
Total  general  expenditures  $368  $315
Current expense  309  247
Capital  expense  59  68
Current education  expenditures  90  141
Health and  welfare  75  22
Police and  fire protection  44  23
Highways  (current expense)  9  12
Current  sewer,  parks,  recreation,  sanitation  25  18
General  government  15  10
Interest  13  13
Other 2
65  24
Total local revenues,  all  local sources  271  219
Local  tax revenues  216  179
Total  intergovernmental  revenue  112  77
Federal  163 5
State  93  72
lIncludes  the  ten  central  cities  which  are  coextensive,  or  nearly  so,  with  a
central  county:  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Boston,  St.  Louis,  Baltimore,  Washington,
Newark,  San  Francisco,  New Orleans,  and  Denver.
2Includes  correction,  general  public  buildings,  housing  and  urban  renewal,
libraries,  natural  resources,  parking  facilities,  water  transport  and  terminals,  and
airports.
3Excludes  Washington,  D.C.,  where  $137  per  capita  of  federal  revenue  is  more
comparable  to  total  state  and  federal  revenues  for  other  cities.
SOURCE:  Bureau  of the  Census,  Local Government Finances in  Selected Metro-
politan Areas in  1965-66.
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portant  political  phenomenon  affecting  central  city population.  Among the
central  cities  of  the  thirty  most  populous  metropolitan  areas,  population
grew  by  1.4  million  during  the  1950's,  although  within  the  political
boundaries  of  the  cities  population  actually  declined  slightly.  All  of  the
increase  was  due to annexations  of suburban territories by newer, medium-
sized  cities  (none  of  the  cities  in  the  fifteen  largest  metropolitan  areas
annexed  significant  population  during  the  1950's).  The  virtual  halt  to
central  city population  growth  in the  1960's  probably reflects  a  diminished
ability  of even  the  middle-sized  central  cities  to  annex  suburbs.  If this  is
the  case,  the  drop  in growth  of  the central  city  is  mainly  evidence  of its
weakening  political  power.
An  important  consequence  of  reduced  central  city  annexation  is  an
acceleration  of  the  political  fragmentation  of  the  metropolitan  area.  This
phenomenon  has  two  damaging  effects  upon  the  central  city.  First,  the
causes  of  fragmentation,  which  are  reflected  in  public  expenditure  differ-
entials,  are  intensified.  One  potentially  important  mechanism  for  the
central  city to  employ in order to  finance public  expenditures  for the poor
is  annexation of new  tax base. An ability to use this weapon increases  even
more  the  burdens  on those  still  living  inside the  old  city  boundaries.  Sec-
ond,  the ability  of local  government  to  deal  effectively  with metropolitan-
wide problems,  such  as pollution  abatement,  waste management,  transpor-
tation,  recreation,  and  public  utilities,  is  undermined  by  jurisdictional
fragmentation.  The  central  city,  with  relatively  less  vacant land  to  devote
to  these  public  activities,  is  especially  affected  when  unable  to  combine
with  suburban  areas.
Aside  from  problems  associated  with  caring  for  the  poor,  big  cities
may  also  be inefficiently  large.  If this  is the case,  population  growth  from
any source,  poor  or rich, may add significantly to the living costs of present
city  residents.  A  new  resident  in a  city pays  only the  average  cost for  his
income  group of living in the city.  If his  coming  causes  average  city  living
costs  to rise,  present  city  residents  will find their  own  costs  increasing  as
the costs created  by the new  resident  are spread over the entire population.
The  significance  of  these  externalities  of  migration  is open  to  debate.
Most of  the costs  attributed  to urban  growth  are  difficult to  measure.  But
some  can  be  supported  by  plausible,  logical  argument,  and  a  few  can  be
demonstrated.
Environmental  pollution  is  one  problem  which  clearly  does  intensify
with  larger  population.  Up  to  certain  limits,  the  natural  environment  can
absorb  some fraction  of  any increase  in contaminants  produced  by society,
but that  fraction  declines  as  the level of pollution  increases.  Consequently
per  capita pollution  rises with  increasing population.  Even  if local govern-
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(and  incurring  greater  expenditures  per  capita)  to  reduce  pollution,  the
decline  in  environmental  quality  represents  a  real  cost  to  individuals,  as
indicated  by  the fact  that most city residents  would  certainly  be  willing  to
pay  some price  to  clean up the  environment.
Local  government  budgets  reveal  a  significant  correlation  between
population  size  and  expenditures.  Of  course,  existing  expenditure  differ-
entials  between  metropolitan  areas  could  represent  differences  in  the
quality  and  extent  of  services  provided,  reflecting  partly  differences  in
incomes  and tastes and partly  different  allocations  of responsibility between
state  and  local  governments.  Nevertheless,  differences  by  population  size
are  fairly  large,  even  after  attempts  to  correct  for  extraneous  effects  by
looking  at cities  of  different  sizes  in the same  regions.  Table  3  shows  per
capita  general  expenditures  and  police  costs  for  the  largest  metropolitan
areas,  by region  and  size  class.  Some  expenditures  are probably  more  re-
lated  to  density  than  size;  for  example,  police  expenditures  are  probably
related  to  the  frequency  of  individual  contacts  and  the  number  of  people
affected  by  a given  act of  violence,  and thus  should  increase  with popula-
tion  density.  But  size and  density  are  highly  correlated;  as  a metropolitan
area grows,  centrally  located land acquires increasing economic advantages,
becomes  more  expensive,  and  is used  more intensively.
TABLE  3.  PER  CAPITA  GENERAL  CURRENT  EXPENDITURES  BY  LOCAL  GOVERN-
MENT  IN THE 38  LARGEST  METROPOLITAN  AREAS,  1965-66
1965 Population  Group  Per Capita Expenditures
1
(Thousands)  and
Expenditure  Item  Total  North  South  West
739-999:
Total general  current
expenditures  $204.57  $217.80  $174.19  $229.57
Police  protection  11.01  10.66  10.55  14.16
1,000-1,699:
Total general  current
expenditures  242.38  246.62  191.46  288.22
Police  protection  14.18  14.89  13.12  14.39
1,700  and  over:
Total  general  current
expenditures  265.99  248.66  .....  361.30
Police protection  18.95  18.45  .....  21.74
lUnweighted  averages  of  per  capita  expenditures  for  areas  included  in  each
regional  and  population  group.
SOURCE:  Bureau  of the  Census,  Local Government Finances in  Selected Metro-
politan Areas in  1965-66.
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particularly  between  the  first two size  groups.  A  rough  interpolation from
the table indicates  that a new  resident  in a metropolitan  area of more than
1 million inhabitants  adds  20 to 50 percent more to local government  costs
than  the  average  tax contribution  of  existing  residents.  The  difference,  of
course,  is made  up through  higher  tax collections  from  the  entire  popula-
tion.
If  local  government  expenditures  reflect  the  true  social  costs  of
metropolitan  area  population  growth,  then  the  externalities  of  urban
concentration  will cause  cities  to grow  inefficiently  large. Individuals  would
continue to  move  into  a metropolitan  area  as long as the  benefits  to them
exceeded  the  costs  they  are required  to pay.  If these  costs  are lower than
the true social costs, people will  continue to move in after the benefits  have
ceased exceeding  the true  costs.
URBAN  POLICIES
An important  consideration  for the development  of public policies  with
regard to urban growth  is the sensitivity  of urban concentration  to national
population  increases.  Because  of  the  decline  in  rural-urban  migration,  a
stabilization  of national population  would just  about halt the growth  of  all
but  a  few  large  metropolitan  areas.
Probably  the most  effective  strategy for  eliminating  further concentra-
tion of the  population  in  already  large urbanized  areas is to check popula-
tion growth,  such  as by providing  birth control  information  and  devices  to
anyone  desiring  them.  With  a  very  slowly  increasing  national  population,
policies  to  check  urban  concentration  further  should  be  oriented  toward
reducing  even  further  rural-urban  migration,  or even  foreign  migration  to
large  cities.  At  the  present  national  population  growth  rate,  the  main
source  of  urban  concentration  will  be  the  natural  increase  in the  present
population  of large  urban  complexes.  In this  case policy  must be  oriented
either  toward  inducing  significant  numbers  of  residents  of  large  metro-
politan  areas to migrate or toward  accommodating  further  growth  of  large
urban  complexes.
With  the  exception  of  the  recently  enacted  program  to  provide  some
minimal  assistance  to  developers  of  new  communities  (most  of which  will
be  satellites  of  present  large  metropolitan  areas),  federal  policy  has  been
oriented,  intentionally  or not,  more toward reducing  rural-urban  migration.
Federal  agencies  provide  assistance  to  rural  communities  and  smaller
cities for  economic  diversification  and development.  These programs  oper-
ate under the plausible assumption that a significant  proportion of migrants
to  large  urban  complexes  would  prefer  to  live  in  smaller  communities
similar to their initial  place  of residence  if only adequate  economic  oppor-
tunities were  available  and  made  known to them.
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tion to big  cities, they  are less likely to generate  substantial migration from
these  areas.  Sentimentality  for  present  life  styles  and  familiar  surround-
ings,  the lack  of  a  strong  motivation  to  investigate  job  opportunities  else-
where  during  periods  of  prosperity,  and  simple  inertia  must  all  be
reckoned  with in  trying  to  induce  individuals  to change  residence.  In  the
absence  of  policies  aimed  at  undermining  economic  opportunities  in large
cities  or  to  force  relocation  (both  of  which  almost  certainly  entail  far
larger  social  costs than  any conceivable  benefits  and,  in any  case,  are  not
feasible  politically),  residents  of  large  metropolitan  areas  are  unlikely  to
respond  to  improved  (subsidized)  conditions  elsewhere.  And  if  subsidies
that adequately  correct  for divergences  between  private and social costs  of
residing  in  different  communities  do  not  induce  significant  migration  to
subsidized  areas,  it  will be  persuasive  evidence  that  the  socially  most  de-
sirable  way  to  settle  the  100  million  additional  Americans  expected  to
arrive  by  the year 2000  is to  make room for most of them  in the nation's
large urban  complexes.
Another  challenge  to  public  policy  is  to  avoid  confusing  the regional
development  problem  of  urban  sprawl  with  the  national  problem  of
poverty.  Many  of  the  problems  normally  associated  with  urbanization
would  evaporate  if  the federal government  were  to  assume  a greater share
of the  financial  burden  of providing  for the poor.  The  first step  should  be
to  federalize  welfare  standards  and costs.
The  case for  a federal  welfare  system cannot  be made  on the  grounds
of  its  presumed  impact  on  rural-urban  migration,  for  the  connection
between  migration  and  differences  among  states  in  welfare  benefits  is  not
very  strong.  The  rapid  growth  in  welfare  rolls  and benefits  in  the  richer
states  began  about  a  decade  ago,  after  migration  to  the  big  cities  had
subsided.  Throughout  the  1960's  welfare  has  continued  to  grow  while
migration  has  declined  further.  The  principal  cause  of  the rise  in persons
receiving welfare  has been  a rapid  increase  in the  proportion  of applicants
for welfare  who  are accepted.  For example,  acceptances  in New York  City
rose  from  51  percent  to  74  percent  of  all  applicants  between  1960  and
1967.  In  the South,  acceptances  have  risen the least,  but nonetheless  sub-
stantially-from  48  to  60 percent.
Aside from social equity arguments,  the principal  reason for federalized
welfare  relates  to  the pressures  expanding  welfare  has brought  to bear  on
state and  local  governments.  Welfare  has  become  the  largest  expenditure
of  many  big  city  governments,  and  is  responsible  for  a  significant  part
of  the  central  city's  disadvantaged  position  with  respect  to  suburbs  in
attracting  new  businesses  and  keeping  higher  income  residents.  Further-
more,  since  less  than  half  of  the  poor  receive  welfare  and  since  welfare
programs  are  primarily  oriented  toward  groups  for  whom  poverty  is  de-
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growth,  in welfare over the next few  years are  dim.
Welfare  is but one  example  of several  social services  closely  related to
poverty  that  ought  to be  financed  to  a greater  degree  by  the federal  gov-
ernment.  Other  examples  are  education,  job  training,  and  public  health.
These  social  services  greatly  facilitate  the reduction  of  poverty,  yet  areas
with  a  large  low-income  population  have  less  financial  ability  to  provide
adequate  services.  A  principal  source  of  urban  poverty  has  historically
been  the  poor  rural  migrant  to  big  cities  who  arrives  inadequately  pre-
pared  by  the  rural  educational  system.  In  recent  years  the  educational
system  in  big  cities,  particularly  in  poverty  areas,  has  deteriorated,  and
now  the poorly educated  city  native is  becoming the main  source  of urban
poverty.  Without  substantial  federal  or  state  assistance,  large  cities  are
unlikely  to  make  the expenditures  necessary  to provide  quality  education,
as well  as  other  social  services,  to the children  of  the poor.
The  final  policy  issue  connected  with  urban  poverty  is the  worsening
of  conditions  in  the  central  city  ghetto.  A  consequence  of  policies  that
reduce  racial  discrimination  in housing is the gradual conversion of ghettos
from  areas  with  considerable  social  and  economic  heterogeneity  to  areas
with  near  uniform  poverty.  While  this  improves  conditions  for  the  low-
middle  and middle income  families  who escape  the slum  ghetto, conditions
for  those who  remain become  worse.  In addition,  the resources  within the
ghetto  for  redevelopment  and  the  attractiveness  of the  ghetto  for  private
investment  (either  by  whites  or  blacks)  are  reduced.  The  effects  upon
poverty  area  children  and  upon  the  viability  of  the  central  city  of  con-
centrating  the hard-core poverty  cases  into homogeneous  central core  areas
are  potentially  devastating.
Ideally,  the  response  of  policy  to  deteriorating  conditions  in  slum
ghettos  would  be  to  make  the  population  of  both  suburbs  and  poverty
areas  more  heterogeneous,  first,  by  undertaking  community  development
projects  for  the poor in suburbs  and,  second,  by attracting middle  income
families back into ghetto neighborhoods. Such  a policy response  will be very
long in developing,  for it faces  two extremely  high barriers.  First, attitudes
among  both  whites  and  blacks  and  among  both  poor  and  nonpoor  are
hardened  against  such  policies.  Among  the  poor,  and  particularly  blacks,
the  hoary "Negro  removal"  aspect  of urban renewal has created justifiable
suspicions  of community development  programs  not run for and by ghetto
residents.  Second,  building viable  communities for the  poor in suburbs  will
be  an  expensive,  long-term  project  even  if  suburban  residents  will  accept
them.
One important  aspect of the  problem is avoiding disastrous  effects upon
employment  among  the  poor  and  near-poor  through  relocation  in  the
suburbs.  Despite  the  more  rapid  growth  of  jobs  in  suburbs,  most  job
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addition,  suburban  employment  is spread  over  a much wider  geographical
area  and  is generally  less  adequately  served by public transportation.  Con-
sequently  the  suburban poor  are  more likely to be physically isolated  from
potential  sites  of  employment.  A  similar  argument  can  be  made  with  re-
spect to shopping  facilities and social contacts in the less densely populated
suburbs.  Suburbanization  of  the  poor  would,  therefore,  require  develop-
ment  of  parallel  employment  opportunities,  shopping  areas,  and  transpor-
tation  systems.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine,  from  both  a  political  and  an
economic perspective,  this type of comprehensive  development  for the slum
ghetto  poor  in  sufficient  scale  to  relocate  a  significant  proportion  of  the
urban  poor  in the reasonably  near future.
The only  other policy  alternative  to dispersion of the  poor is  so-called
ghetto  gilding.  In  fact,  most  existing  or  proposed  urban  redevelopment
schemes  fall into this category:  public housing, urban renewal, model cities,
black  capitalism,  tax incentives  for ghetto investments,  etc.  Recently  it has
become  in vogue  to  speak  of  mobilizing  private capital  to  reconstruct  the
ghetto.
To  evaluate  alternative  ghetto-gilding  policies,  it  is  useful  to  make  a
distinction between  the blighted  slum or  poverty  area and the deteriorating
but  still  viable  low-income  (but  not  poverty)  neighborhood.  In the latter
case  incomes  are  generally  rising,  the number  of stable families headed by
an  employed parent  is  high,  and  programs  to induce  self-improvement  or
investment  from  outside  have  some  chance  for  success.  But  in the  worst
slums,  with  high  unemployment,  many  unstable  families,  and  declining
incomes  and  population,  it  is  futile  to  expect  the  private  sector  to  make
the investments  necessary  for redevelopment  without  extremely large  gov-
ernmental  subsidies.  In these  areas  massive  public  expenditures  are neces-
sary  if  living  conditions  are  to be  significantly  improved.  Eventually  such
expenditures  might  raise  incomes  and  improve  physical  conditions  suffi-
ciently  to make  the  slum  ghetto  attractive  to business  and more successful
families,  but this  is  a  distant hope.
The  preceding  remarks  have  centered  on  policies  to  deal  with  urban
poverty  because,  first,  so  many  of our urban problems  are in reality  local
outcroppings in especially  virulent form of the national  problem  of poverty
and,  second,  because the  future pattern of urban growth depends  critically
upon the  policy response  to poverty-both urban and rural.  Past migration
of  the  rural  poor  to  large  cities  and  the  concentration  of  the  poor,  par-
ticularly of minority  groups,  in central  cities has substantially biased urban
development  toward  fragmentation  and  suburbanization.  In  the  absence
of  other  policies  for  effectively  combatting  urban  poverty,  the  task  of
arriving  at rational  solutions to  other urban problems  is made  immensely
more  difficult.
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